Back in the mid-1980s, when this correspondent was leaving university, I remember reading some forecasts in the The Economist magazine about the coming year. One was a bold prediction about Japan replacing the US as the world's pre-eminent economic superpower.
The forecast was way off beam, of course, but I was reminded of it by an economist called Dylan Grice, who has just started a new series of weekly investment research articles at Societe Generale under the title 'Popular Delusions'.
If his first effort is any guide, Grice knows how to grab the readers' attention. See this introductory paragraph: "Studying the lessons from Japan's lost decade(s) is key for anyone seeking to understand today's post-bubble world. But a closer reading of Japan's financial history illuminates today's China far more. In the early 1980s, on the eve of its financial liberalisation, Japan was the rising power from the East set to overtake the West. Younger and growing rapidly, it was still a decade away from its climactic and catastrophic bubble peak. This is where China is now."
The SocGen man argues that China may develop into the biggest bubble the world has ever seen – and that this is the main lesson we should learn from Japan's experience, where almost two decades have been lost in a deflationary spiral, post-bubble.
Grice argues that Japan's deflation was probably more down to demographics than excess debt at the time, being the first industrial economy to begin demographic contraction. The read-across to China rests on the fact that, because of Deng Xiaoping's one-child policy, introduced in 1979 to curb what was seen as a ballooning population problem, China could soon face the very same problem.
In Japan, demand deflated at least partly because the workforce has been shrinking. In fact, while real GDP growth has been far stronger in the US than Japan over the past 20 years, on a "per worker" basis growth has roughly been the same in the two countries over the period.
Because of the one-child policy, China's working age population is forecast to plateau from 2015, falling off sharply thereafter.
But Grice also goes on to argue that China is facing a whole range of challenges that have already been faced by Japan, demographics being just one.
"From the strained currency diplomacy to the accusation of favouring exports over domestic demand, from the Western marvelling at 'Confucian capitalism' to the sense of inevitability about the rising of a great power in the East… all were as true for Japan 30 years ago as they are of China today. And Japan 30 or so years ago might be a more fruitful analogy altogether. There is a clear historic coincidence of manias and geopolitical shifts. In the 1980s, Japan's developing financial bubble reflected a shifting of the balance of power in its direction."
What's worrying here is that the geopolitical shift towards China that we have seen in recent years dwarfs anything seen regarding Japan in the 1980s. In fact, Grice notes, it probably dwarfs anything yet seen in the history of the modern world. A commensurate financial mania might lead to excesses way beyond the periodic bouts of market frothiness we have already seen in China.
Examples here are numerous – first-day issues on the stock market by mundane businesses that then double in price, speculators opening trading accounts at the rate of a million a month, etc.
Herein lies the greatest danger, according to Grice.
Back in 1980, interest rate markets and cross-border capital flows were as tightly regulated in Japan as they are now in China. Also, as China today is accused of using these financial controls to maintain a cheap yuan, so the Japanese were accused of using their regulations to keep the yen artificially low.
Japan eventually succumbed to heavy international pressure, liberalising its system in the mid-1980s – providing a monetary fuel that sent the local stock market headed towards the moon. As Grice notes: "Japan's experience also hints at what may be the future catalyst unleashing this frenzy: capital account liberalisation. Financial history is filled with financial liberalisations gone wrong and Japan's bubble can be traced directly to the removal of controls on international capital flows and banking in the early 1980s. Seeking a larger international role for the renminbi, China is now, albeit tentatively, embarking on a similar path. Full liberalisation, when it occurs, could be the starting gun for the biggest bubble the world has ever seen."
That's quite a scary prediction, of course.
- The writer is an Associate Editor with the Financial Times
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