As the dangerously large cracks in the global financial systems have been addressed by governments and central banks, and as most banking systems show signs of increased stability, regulators around the world are now beginning to consolidate new and more stringent liquidity rules and regulations. For some time, capital rules have been the overriding regulatory block but since the global financial downturn which, in many cases, had liquidity stresses and vulnerability at its epicentre, liquidity management and its oversight is now the new mantra for banks and their supervisors. Banks which suffered had inadequate quality and quantity of liquid asset buffers, leading to an inability to liquidate them in a stress event. Specific liquidity risk factors included over-reliance on short-term credit-sensitive wholesale funding markets; large pipelines of new business with limited or no ability to fund them; over-reliance for funding on securitisation markets; inability to meet significant retail outflows; and firms entering into ratings-based liquidity contracts without valuing the underlying option. Regulators globally are proposing tough new rules on minimum liquidity measures and metrics and, at the same time, banks are arguing that in a number of areas, proposed rules have the risk of being too onerous. Bank supervisors are inevitably likely to give some ground but without doubt liquidity measures implemented will be much tougher, and rightly so, of those implemented in the past which were exposed as too narrow and light. There are a number of specific areas which are being tightened. Immediate liquidity, which is the amount of cash on hand a bank has available to support its operations, will be increased. Some regulators are recommending that banks must have cash on hand to fund 30 days of operations, a very tough rule, while others, such as the UK's Financial Services Authority, are suggesting 20 days. Whatever time is decided upon, it will certainly be much more stringent than the generally required five days of operations currently. This will have a major impact on banks' balance sheets and, in turn, on their profitability, as they will have to allocate a large proportion of their funds to lower yielding cash and government securities as opposed to higher yielding loans and advances. There is an emerging international consensus among prudential supervisors that liquid assets should be high quality assets that can be readily sold or used as collateral in private markets, even when those markets may be under stress; as a backstop, liquid assets should also be eligible central bank collateral for normal market operations. In most currencies, sovereign bonds will be the assets that most clearly satisfy these criteria. Bahrain's central bank is preparing to tighten its rules on liquidity, after troubles at the two Saad Group banks forced the Bahrain authorities to take control of both institutions. Banks will have to increase the amount of liquid assets held, submit to more frequent checks by the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) and ensure that their long-term lending obligations do not starve them of ready cash in a crisis. The CBB does not currently have specific rules on liquidity. The proposed regulations include a minimum 25 per cent liquidity ratio for all banks, and extend existing rules curbing asset-liquidity mismatches from retail to wholesale banks. Other GCC regulators are likely to follow in enhancing their liquidity rules. The intermediation role of banks to transform short-term deposits into long-term loans, makes them vulnerable to liquidity risks, and particularly if there is any question of confidence. Funding can quickly dry up, and much faster than expected or foreseen by institutions. A liquidity buffer, such as excess cash and government bonds, provides support in periods of pressure. The actual definition of liquid assets is also being tightened, particularly those connected to the often volatile interbank lending market which was also heavily exposed during the global financial crisis. Liquid assets will have to be unencumbered, and unambiguously so in case they are needed at any point in the future. New liquidity regulation will rightly be woven into an amended Basel II capital framework. Previously, liquidity risk was largely ignored by the framework but, as was clearly evident in the crisis, a strong capital adequacy metric is of little benefit in a market meltdown where what is needed to survive is funding. Importantly, counter cyclicality, which is building and maintaining high liquidity and capital throughout all economic cycles, will be central to the framework. Liquidity is a factor of leverage and leverage will be an integral metric of the Basel II framework, with a possible maximum borrowings position of no more than 25 times assets. In order to ensure comparability, the details of the leverage ratio will be harmonised internationally, fully adjusting for differences in accounting